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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to develop the assumption that Winnicott’s work can correspond to a possible 
realization of the elaboration project of a non-naturalistic scientific psychology, as it is found in phenomenology 
and modern existentialism philosophical conceptions. After distinguishing the clinical aspects of these philosophical 
propositions, I try to show that Winnicott, on one hand, rejects the use of naturalistic metapsychological speculations, 
on the other hand, reformulates the ontological model of psychoanalysis, introducing the notion of being; 
additionally, he introduced a notion of health and redescribed the theory of socioemotional development of the 
human being, focusing on dependency relationships. Such changes would place psychoanalysis in a non-naturalistic 
epistemological framework, in accordance with the philosophical influences above mentioned, changing at the 
same time the psychoanalytical practice itself, both in its objectives and handling.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, phenomenology, existentialism, epistemology, psychotherapy.
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Kant had already discussed the construction of 
knowledge of man’s way of being (his behaviors, feelings, 
laws and existential and relational dynamics) as a project 
that may be performed in two different epistemological 
frameworks, depending on whether it is considered a 
nature being (or a physis being) or not.  “A systematic 
treatise comprising our knowledge of man (anthropology) 
can adopt either a physiological or a pragmatic point of 
view. – Physiological knowledge of man investigates 
what nature makes of him: pragmatic, what man as a free 
agent makes, or can and should make, of himself” (Kant, 
1798/1997a, pp. 21-22). In both fields of Anthropology 
(or psychology) there is metaphysics that is base for the 
construction of this knowledge: a metaphysics of nature, 
in which the man is in his laws of causal determination 
as determined as any other natural being, made explicit 
by Kant in Critique of Pure Reason; and a metaphysics 
of morals, where man is able to do and let them do, 
also made explicit by the author in Critique of Practical 
Reason (Cf.  Fulgencio, 2006a, 2008b, Gabby Jr., 2004, 
Loparic, 2003).
Psychology as science was founded in the 19th 
Century, whether in Fechner or Wundt, as proposal 
of being a nature science (Anthropology from the 
physiological point of view), even if certain reactions to 
this perspective have already pointed to another direction 
with Brentano. In this extensive framework, I want to 
call attention to the fact that the proposals of Skinner and 
Freud are both of construction of a naturalist psychology, 
despite their differences.
I will briefly retake Freud’s position, since part 
of his discoveries will be later amplified and inserted 
by Winnicott into another epistemological framework, 
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which differs from his naturalist framework. Summarily, 
psychoanalysis, for Freud, provided science with the 
possibility to know the life of the soul as any other object 
strange to man, therefore being a nature science as any 
other (1933/2001c); his model of man, that is, his way of 
conceiving how the psychic life is, is constructed into a 
as if logic, with help from several analogical speculations 
applied to psychism and its dynamic, namely: man’s 
consideration, referring to his psychological ontology, 
as if it were a psychical apparatus, driven by forces and 
energies (Cf. to Fulgencio, 2005).
In the phenomenological philosophy field, 
Husserl has criticized man as a nature being, considering 
that man has another way of being. In the case of the 
construction of psychology as science, he criticizes 
the fact that it has naturalist limitations that should 
be precisely surpassed by the phenomenology: 
“phenomenology constitutes the essential eidetic basis 
of psychology and of the sciences of the spirit” (Husserl, 
1986, p. 47). It necessarily implies ontology, telos, and a 
way of causal determination, different from those that 
Kant made explicit in his physiological anthropology. 
In a direction aligned with Husserl’s, we can recognize 
in philosophy a number of proposals that support this 
specificity of man’s way of being, as in Kierkegaard, 
Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre, for instance. We can 
gather those perspectives, as it has been done by 
Ellenberger, under the rubric of modern existentialism, 
also dealing with distinguishing philosophical 
proposals from its applicability in psychological or 
psychiatric science field, since the epistemological and 
methodological frameworks of science and philosophy 
are constituted differently (and my interest is to show, 
in psychoanalysis and psychology scientific field, that 
this has been modified by Winnicott, going from a 
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naturalist framework to an existentialist one). In this 
sense, Ellenberger states:
What clinically are phenomenology and existential 
analysis? It may be appropriate first to clarify what 
they are not. In contradistinction to a common 
prejudice, they do not represent a confusing 
interference of philosophy into the field of 
psychiatry. It is true that there is a philosophical 
trend called “phenomenology”, founded by Edmund 
Husserl, and there is another philosophical trend 
called “existentialism”, whose major representatives 
are Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre. 
But there is a wide gap between the philosophical 
phenomenology of Husserl and the psychiatric 
phenomenology of Minkowski and between 
existentialist philosophy and the psychiatric method 
called existential analysis. Analogously, there is a 
branch of physics concerned with the investigation 
of X-rays, and there is a branch of medicine, 
radiology, concerned with the application of X-rays 
for medical purposes; yet nobody will contend 
that medical radiology represents a confusing 
interference of physics into medicine.  In a similar 
way, psychiatric phenomenologists and existential 
analysts are psychiatrists utilizing certain new 
philosophical concepts as tools for psychiatric 
investigation. (1958, p. 92)
Therefore, in this analysis my interest is much 
more in the clinical aspects of phenomenology and modern 
existentialism – expressed in practices of psychological 
care, found in psychiatric phenomenology, existentialist 
psychology and daseinanalysis – than in analyzing these 
conceptions in the philosophy field, seeking to highlight 
the presence of some of these conceptions in the way 
Winnicott conceives psychoanalysis as objective science 
of human nature. 
There is a common starting point in all modern 
existentialists, ant it is related to the characterization of 
the specificity of the human being’s way of being. I will 
bring back, only in indicative way, Kierkegaard’s and 
Heidegge’s positions, as two main examples which seek 
to characterize this ontology.
For Kierkegaard: 
Man is not a ready-made being; man will become 
what he makes of himself and nothing more. Man 
constructs himself through his choices, because 
he has the freedom to make vital choices, above 
all the freedom to choose between an inauthentic 
and an authentic modality of existence. Inauthentic 
existence is the modality of the man who lives 
under the tyranny of the plebs (the crowd, i.e., the 
anonymous collectivity). Authentic existence is the 
modality in which a man assumes the responsibility 
of his own existence. (Ellenberger, 1958, p. 118)
Besides, for him, there is a constitutive anguish of 
the human way of being, anguish that derives from the 
fact that man is the only responsible for his choices (he is 
the “free” responsible for deciding to do and let them do); 
he is, in fact, obliged to choose, and this responsibility 
generates an existential constitutional anguish1.
For Heidegger, Daisen is considered as the human 
being’s specific way of being, whose main characteristic 
is making (configuring, creating) oneself, the other 
and the world in which one lives. In the book The 
fundamental concepts of metaphysics:  world, finitude, 
solitude (1983/2003), he seeks to characterize this way of 
being different; what is the world for the several types of 
beings: “1. The stone (material) is wordless; 2 The animal 
is poor in world; 3. Man is world-forming” (p. 207). 
Throughout his work, we also find a series of expressions 
that aim at describing what this human being’s specific 
way of being is, such as: being-there; being-with; being-
in-the-world; being-along-with; being-one-with-the-
other; being-toward-death, etc. All expressions, before 
being understood as concepts, should be understood as 
descriptions of properly ways of being human beings.
 The important here for my analysis, gathering these 
highlighted aspects, is rather pointing to the empirical, 
phenomenological meaning of this conception of what the 
human being’s way of being is than having a conceptual 
philosophical discussion, which would lead us to the 
field of analytical-critical story of philosophy history, 
redirecting our focus on the analysis of psychology as 
science. In a certain way, I am separating philosophical 
problems and practices from clinical-psychotherapist 
problems and practices, refusing a clinical philosophy 
and a philosophical clinic.
We know that Binswanger and Boss sought 
to construct a proposal of scientific psychology and 
psychotherapist care practice from the groundings of 
Heidegger’s analytical existentialism. One of the critiques 
against Binswanger is that he confused philosophy with 
science fields, sometimes performing a pseudo-philosophy, 
sometimes a pseudoscience (Cf. the critical analysis 
of this proposal in Loparic’s article, 2002). Regardless 
of whether this synthesis can be evaluated as good or 
unsuccessful, I want to defend here the hypothesis that 
Winnicott’s proposal, in his theoretical-practical-semantic 
reformulation of psychoanalysis, presented a scientific 
psychology that would be aligned with the conceptual 
framework of modern existentialists, remaining in the 
field of science, whether in terms of the description of 
a theory of emotional development or in terms of his 
re-description of the psychotherapeutic treatment method. 
In other words, my hypothesis could also be expressed in 
the enunciation of the following question: can Winnicott’s 
psychoanalysis, in his proposal to make psychoanalysis 
an objective science of human nature, be considered the 
1 It, thinking about existentialist psychotherapeutic practices, should not 
be confused with the anguish that comes from the affective story of the 
human being (Oedipal anguishes, for example).
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accomplishment of the project of constructing a scientific 
psychology from the groundings of phenomenology and 
existential analysis point of view?
Proximity of Winnicott’s semantics to 
modern existentialism semantics.  
Seeking a method for the 
dialogue between different 
theoretical-semantic perspectives 
By retaking Winnicott’s specific semantic-
conceptual innovations set, we can list a series of 
terms and/or expressions that are not part of the classic 
psychoanalytic semantics, such as: acts and transitional 
phenomena; playing action; potential space; place in 
which we live; illusion of omnipotence; the paradox of 
creating-finding objects; primary maternal concern; 
invasion and environmental failure; absolute and 
relative dependence; subjective object; true self and false 
self; imaginative elaboration; essential solitude; being; 
continuity of being; innate tendency to integration; 
trauma as break in the line of being; original creativity; 
pure feminine and pure masculine elements; sacred 
heart of the self; silent communication; ability to have 
faith in ...; deprivation and antisocial tendency; ability 
to stay; mother-object; mother-environment; difference 
between need and desire; survival of the analyst; use 
of the object; unthinkable anguish; traumatic action; 
freezing of the traumatic situation; thawing; feeling 
real; distinction between psyche, sum and mind; life 
worth living; spontaneity. Among these, I want highlight 
some of them that seem to be very close, despite not 
being identical, to conceptions recognizable in the 
modern existentialism field, as the notions of being, 
continuity of being, true self and false self, trauma as 
break in the line of being, place in which we live, life 
worth living, spontaneity.
This semantic proximity does not mean that 
Winnicott imported, in a direct connection or direct 
applicability, conceptions from a philosophical system 
or clinical system (from psychiatric phenomenology, 
existentialist psychology, or from daseinanalysis) and 
inserted them into psychoanalysis. The influence from 
philosophy or other theoretical systems of psychology 
(and even from psychoanalysis) on Winnicott’s thought 
does not occur in this way. Winnicott himself states how 
it works, in terms of its influences: “What happens is 
that I gather this and that, here and there, settle down 
to clinical experience, form my own theories and then, 
last of all, interest myself in looking to see where I stole 
what” (1945/2000, p. 218).
Here we have an epistemological-methodological 
problem that relates to the way in which the relationships 
(of influence, communication, and dialogue) between 
philosophy and science, between the different sciences, 
between the various theoretical-semantic systems of 
psychoanalysis will be conceived. One can say, based 
on Thomas Kuhn’s work (1970/1975, 1977, 2000/2006) 
that a philosophical system (in this case, phenomenology, 
existentialism), and a theoretical-clinical system (psychiatric 
phenomenology, existentialist psychology), are paradigms 
different from that proposed by Freud; and thus different 
from psychoanalysis. In this perspective, considering that 
paradigms or disciplinary matrices are different realities, 
we should ask ourselves whether the same terms (used by 
different paradigms) have the same referent, or whether 
different terms can be related to the same phenomena, so 
as to know whether, by placing to ourselves the issue of 
proximity, resemblance, distance or even impossibility of 
communication between different theoretical-semantic 
systems (different paradigms), we are or are not in the 
field in which a dialogue or mutual influence may occur. 
In this same direction, the communication between two 
theoretical systems depends on the understanding of the 
referents of their conceptions, that is, it is through the 
phenomena described or made visible that it is possible to 
describe and/or explain/understand what a system may 
communicate to the other or to what it may contribute.
Freud himself pointed this perspective by 
commenting how psychoanalysis and anthropology could 
contribute to each other, in Totem and Taboo: 
“It is a necessary defect of studies which seek to 
apply the point of view of psychoanalysis to the 
mental sciences that they cannot do justice to either 
subject. They therefore confine themselves to the 
role of incentives and make suggestions to the 
expert which he should take into consideration in 
his work.2 (Freud, 1913/1998, p. 283) 
In my understanding, it is much more than an 
incitement somewhat vague; it is, in Freud’s proposal, 
the use of something that we know in one field as being 
useful to know something we do not know in other field, 
that is, use of analogical research method (Cf. Fulgencio, 
2006b, 2008b).3
Considered this distinction and this methodological 
proposal, I can clarify a second point connected to this 
one, and it directly refers to the relationship between 
Winnicott and the modern existentialism, whether in 
philosophical terms or scientific clinical terms. First: I 
am not affirming that Winnicott agrees with or follows 
2 This excerpt corresponds to a part of the annex “De quelques 
concordances dans la vie d’âme des sauvages et des névroses”, composed 
of five paragraphs published in March, 1912, on Imago magazine, as an 
introduction to the first part of Totem and Taboo; they have been replaced 
with a written preface when the book was published in September, 1913. 
This annex was omitted in posterior editions and only published in 1987 
(Nachtragsband da Gesammelte Werke). This excerpt was mentioned 
from the text of Complete Psychological Works published in French 
(Nachtragsband da Gesammelte Werke) (Freud, 1913/1998).
3 It may be a fruitful path for the dialogue and conjunction of knowledge 
coming from different theoretical-semantic systems in psychoanalysis, 
methodological issue that has been object of concern of the International 
Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), as the article of Bohleber et al. 
(2013) shows.
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the conceptual or ideological philosophical system 
of some philosopher somehow associated with the 
modern existentialism. Winnicott cannot be considered 
Kierkegaardian, Diltheyan, Sartrian, Merleau-Pontyan or 
even Heideggerian; as Freud, even using and sometimes 
quoting philosophers and philosophies, he cannot be 
considered Schopenhauerian, Nietzschean, Kantian, etc. 
In this sense, it is not a question of making a projection 
affirming that Winnicott or Freud construed their 
thoughts from some specific philosophical system. 
Second: likewise, it is not possible to say that Winnicott 
identitarily embraces the clinical-theoretical system of 
psychiatric phenomenology, existentialist psychology or 
daseinanalysis.
What I am defending and analyzing is the fact that 
Winnicott has brought to psychoanalysis the recognition 
(within this framework and with these methodological 
provisos) of some phenomena, as well as the consideration 
of some conceptions that are in agreement with and 
similar to those which modern existentialists use in their 
thought systems.
After clarifying that it is not a matter of 
asserting that Winnicott is affiliated with one or 
another philosophical system, one must consider that 
he is not affiliated with any of the existentialist clinical 
perspectives. It is not by affiliation or direct import that 
these relations (or “influences”) occur, either in Winnicott 
or in Freud. Thus, in the same way that retaking the 
existentialist philosophical systems is not aligned with 
my proposal, it is not necessary to retake the theoretical-
practical systems of psychiatric phenomenology, 
existentialist psychology, and daseinanalysis to consider 
that Winnicott has some conceptions similar to those of 
these perspectives. Submitting my analysis or hypothesis 
to the need for retaking these theoretical systems in the 
perspective of analysis which I am proposing, would be 
an epistemological, methodological error, and even an 
error of understanding of what I am proposing.
Now, I will analyze more specifically how the 
notion of being and the notion of false self and true self 
appear in Winnicott’s work, opening the way for further 
analysis of the notion of creating-finding oneself and the 
other (create the world in which we live), as well as of 
the notion of health, considering that all of them have 
meanings and referents close to those found in philosophy 
and existentialist psychotherapy practices.
The notion of being in Winnicott’s work 
Considering that psychoanalysis has its focus 
of attention and work on the being has already been 
emphasized by Georges Amado (1978, 1979). In this 
direction, he proposed an ontological psychoanalysis, of 
which Winnicott would have had the intuition, without, 
however, having analyzed Winnicott’s work in detail, 
seeking to make explicit how this notion was historically 
and critically inserted.
Other psychoanalysts also recognize the fact that 
it was Winnicott who, more explicitly, introduced the 
notion of being in psychoanalysis, whether as an action 
of development and expansion of psychoanalysis, or to 
criticize it.
René Roussillon (2009) considers that Winnicott 
made an epistemological rupture with the insertion of the 
notion of being in psychoanalysis, providing an immense 
construction site, since this insertion implies in numerous 
theoretical-practical modifications (123).
On the other hand, André Green (2011) has also 
dedicated himself to analyzing this Winnicott’s proposal, 
but in an extremely critical way, considering that it 
corresponds more to a Winnicott’s  emotional defense, 
an ingenuous symptom to avoid his personal problems 
relating to the aggressiveness and destrubility of the 
human being: “I suppose that, instead of accepting the 
idea of a death drive, Winnicott reacted by introducing 
the being concept–that is, of a being that would be strong 
enough to oppose the temptation to totally destroy the 
object, or could at least help survive its attacks” ( p. 83). 
Green focuses his criticism on arguments associated with 
Winnicott’s affective story and personality, interpreting 
him as if he were his patient, without properly developing 
the theoretical-clinical issues and their relations with 
the phenomena-problems that Winnicott’s proposals 
enunciate: his theory of aggression, his theory of 
repetition compulsion, his consideration of there being 
existential phenomena that are not reducible or referable 
to the life drive, etc. As far as I know, Green, a lover of 
metapsychology (1995) and death drive (2010), was not 
able to clearly see the phenomena described by Winnicott, 
reacting in defense of his own conceptions.
Winnicott’s insertion of the notion of being into 
psychoanalysis, his much more clinical rather than 
philosophical appreciation, seems to me as having two 
sources: on the one hand his experience with psychotic 
patients, since they are confronted with the existential 
issue of being, with experiences of non-being; and on the 
other hand, his personal characteristics, his formation 
in addition to the influence coming from the horizon 
of his time, in which existentialism emerged as a 
clinical alternative, as we can see, for example, in an 
important book published in 1958, which we can assume 
to be of his knowledge (although this is a speculative 
hypothesis): Existence. A New Dimension in Psychiatry 
and Psychology (May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1958); these 
existentialism conceptions were part of the horizon of 
his time, and we know that there were many close to 
him who shared this perspective (Ronald Laing among 
them, for instance).
Fulgencio (2014b) made a census of presence and 
use of the notion of being in Winnicott’s work, noting 
that not only most references to the term are made in 
the 1960s, but also that a more conceptual use occurs 
only in that decade. He sought to show that what matters 
to Winnicott is not so much the concept of being, but 
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the experience of being or non-being that his patients 
report in the analytic process. It is precisely from this 
experience that he will formulate his understanding of 
what human nature is.
In one excerpt, which seems to me to be one of 
the most direct about his notion of being, he says:
I wish to postulate a state of being which is a fact in 
the ordinary baby before birth as well as afterwards. 
This state of being belongs to the infant and not to 
the observer. Continuity of being is health. If one 
takes the analogy of a bubble, one can say that if the 
pressure outside is adapted to the pressure inside, 
then the bubble has a continuity of existence and if 
it were a human baby this would be called “being”. 
(1988/1990, p. 148)
In the same direction, which characterizes Dasein 
as world-forming, we have Winnicott’s discovery of the 
nature of transitional phenomena and objects, since they 
highlight the playing action as synonymous with the 
very continuity of being, as expression of the creation of 
oneself and of the world in which we live, establishing the 
playing action as universal foundation of human nature. 
I retake some Winnicott’s statements in this sense: “It 
is in playing, and only in playing that the individual 
child or adult is able to be creative and to use the whole 
personality: and it is only in being creative that the 
individual discovers the self” (1971/1975c, p. 80); “For 
me, playing leads on naturally to cultural experience 
and indeed forms its foundation” (1971/1975b, p. 147). 
For Winnicott, this playing action will be a foundation 
of the psychotherapeutic process:
Psychotherapy takes place in the overlap of two 
areas of playing, that of the patient and that of 
the therapist.  Psychotherapy has to do with two 
people playing together. The corollary of this is that 
where playing is not possible, the work done by the 
therapist is directed towards bringing the patient 
from a state of  not being able to play into a state of 
being able to play. (1968/1975a, p. 59)
Winnicott defends the playing action as a 
foundation of human existence (although this is not an 
innate capacity but something that happens after certain 
emotional integrations have already happened, even 
if some patients or people are ill and do not have this 
capacity). In this sense, Winnicott says:
In other words, it is play that is the universal, 
and that belongs to health: playing facilitates 
growth and therefore health; playing leads into 
group relationships; playing can be a form of 
communication in psychotherapy; and, lastly, 
psychoanalysis has been developed as a highly 
specialized form of playing in the service of 
communication with oneself and others. The natural 
thing is playing, and the highly sophisticated 
twentieth-century phenomenon is psychoanalysis. 
It must be of value to the analyst to be constantly 
reminded not only of what is owed to Freud but also 
of what we owe to the natural and universal thing 
called playing. (1968/1975a, p. 63)
Winnicott will also consider that it is due to 
the expansion of the playing activity (expansion of the 
transitional phenomena) that the human being enters the 
world of culture, finding himself and the other. Therefore, 
playing corresponds to being-with, being-with-the-other, 
constituting itself and the place where one can live, which 
seems to correspond (or be very close) to what Heidegger 
says when he affirms that Dasein creates itself, creates 
the world in which it lives, giving meaning to itself and 
to the other.
The notion of false self and true self 
in Winnicott 
Winnicott recognizes that his conception of true 
self and false self (as human being’s ways of being) has 
its origin in certain conceptions of philosophy, in certain 
religious systems and in psychiatry: 
This concept is not in itself new. It appears in 
various guises in descriptive psychiatry and notably 
in certain religious and philosophical systems. 
Evidently a real clinical exists which deserves 
study, and the concept presents psycho-analysis as 
an aetiological challenge. (1965/1983d, p. 128)
This does not mean that his conception of false 
self and true self corresponds to an application of the 
conceptions that are in its origin. For him, these two 
ways of being are constitutive of the way of being 
human, just as his patients report how they feel; 
how they sometimes feel that have a life that is too 
adapted, which would oppose to a more spontaneous 
way of being:
The concept of ‘A False Self’ needs to be balanced 
by a formulation of that which could properly be 
called the True Self. At the earliest stage the True 
Self is the theoretical position from which come 
the spontaneous gesture and the personal idea. 
The spontaneous gesture is the True Self in action. 
Whereas a True Self feels real, the existence of a 
False Self results in a felling unreal or a sense of 
futility. (1965/1983d, p. 135)
It could be said, using a metaphor for pedagogical 
purposes, that false being and true being are like water 
and wine mixed, therefore inseparable and constituent of 
the way of being human, although one can momentarily 
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appear or take place in a more accentuated way. The false 
self is part of the healthy organization, the pathological 
false self corresponds to a domination (of the adaptive 
aspects of the individual), establishing a hegemony in 
the individual’s way of being.
Thus, paradoxically, the notion of false self 
and true self originates in philosophical, religious and 
psychiatric systems (in what seems to be a clear reference 
to what we can find in modern existentialism), while at 
the same time it does not correspond to its meanings and 
original referent elements (e.g. authentic life, authenticity) 
found in these systems.
Winnicott’s psychoanalysis as objective 
science of human nature 
To conclude this point of my analysis, it should be 
highlighted that Winnicott places psychoanalysis in an 
epistemological framework that is much closer to what 
phenomenology and existential analytics expected for 
the constitution of a scientific psychology than Freud’s 
proposal of the creation of psychoanalysis as a science 
of nature.
I retake some Winnicott’s statements on 
human nature: “The task is the study of human 
nature” (1988/1990, p. 21), “What is the state of the 
human individual as the being emerges out of not 
being?” What is the basis of human nature in terms 
of individual development? What is the fundamental 
state to which every individual, however old and with 
whatever experiences, can return in order to start 
again?” (1988/1990, p. 153), “The life of an individual 
is an interval between two states of unaliveness. The 
first of these, out of which unaliveness arises, colours 
ideas people have about the second death” (1988/1990, 
p. 154). We could, in this same direction, place a 
Winnicott’s and a Heidegger’s phrase side by side, 
recognizing significant semantic and conceptual 
proximity between them: “Human Being is a time-
sample of human nature” (1988/1990, p. 11); “Man is 
the placeholder of the nothing” [Der Mensch ist der 
Platzhalter des Nichts] Heidegger, 1929/2000, p. 60).
For Freud, the great contribution from 
psychoanalysis to science was to have placed the life 
of the soul to be understood as any other object which is 
foreign to man, that is, as a natural object (1933 / 2001c, 
Lesson 35). It is in this direction that he considers the 
life of the soul as if it were a psychic apparatus. For 
Winnicott, however, we have other ontology: the human 
being is constituted and driven by the need for being 
and keeping on being… It is within the framework of 
this new ontology, refusing to think of man as if he 
were a machine, recognizing causal determinations 
that are human (and not reducible or analogous to 
the causal determinations of natural systems), that 
Winnicott considers psychoanalysis as an objective 
science of human nature, leading psychoanalysis to 
an epistemological framework different from that 
used by Freud.
Winnicott’s position in relation to 
metapsychology 
Fulgencio (2008b) dedicated himself to 
analyzing the nature and function of metapsychology 
as a mode of Freudian theorization, then considering 
it not so much in its broad meaning as a theory of the 
unconscious but in its specific meaning as a set of 
speculative auxiliary concepts of heuristic validity 
only, which Freud characterized as speculative 
superstructure of psychoanalysis (1925/2001b). 
The speculative, central and structuring concepts 
of Freudian metapsychology, as everyone knows, 
are: the psychic forces or drives, which Freud clearly 
recognizes as a kind of mythology; the psychic energies 
– the psychic energy in fact sometimes referred to 
as quantum of affection, sometimes as libido; both 
supposed energies whose heuristic value would 
justify their use as speculative auxiliary theoretical 
construction; and the very idea of a psychic apparatus, 
which everyone knows is a fiction.
In the history of the development of psychoanalysis, 
as Assoun (1993, 2000, 2006) noted, this mode of 
theorization has been expanded and modified into 
different degrees (for example, Abraham, Ferenczi, 
Klein, Federn, Anna Freud), replaced with another of 
the same speculative nature (for example: Bion, Lacan); 
used as a toolbox (Marty, Aulagnier), and in the extreme 
case of Winnicott, who is for him an author indifferent 
to metapsychology (refer to  Assoun, 2000, pp. 114-116, 
2006). 
Retaking, then, Winnicott’s position, which 
goes in the direction of those who defend the need for 
using theoretical fictions such as those that characterize 
Freudian metapsychology, we have an explanation by 
himself about his position:
. . . we are trying to express the same things, only I 
have an irritating way of saying things in my own 
language instead of learning how to use the terms 
of psycho-analytic metapsychology. I’m trying to 
find out why it is that I am deeply suspicion of these 
terms. Is it because they can give an appearance of 
a common understanding when such understanding 
does not exist? Or is it because of something in 
myself? It can, of course, be both. (1987/1990, letter 
sent to Anna Freud in 1954, p. 51)
Fulgencio has devoted himself to this type of 
discussion by asking about the place of metapsychological 
theorization in Winnicott’s work, arguing that he 
rejected certain ways of theorizing, such as the use of 
speculative metaphors (Fulgencio, 2005, 2007, 2008a, 
2015, Girard, 2010, 2017). Also, in this same direction, 
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he sought to show that Winnicott has rewritten several 
classic terms of Freudian metapsychology, giving 
them empirical references that make them no longer 
speculative theoretical constructions (in other words, they 
are not heuristic fictions), moving away from Freudian 
speculations (Fulgencio, 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 
2014a, 2014c).
Winnicott’s proposal to present a psychoanalytic 
theory that differs from and moves away from Freud’s 
naturalistic metapsychology also seems to me to reiterate 
the hypothesis that names this article, establishing, on 
the one hand, another ontology and, on the other hand, 
a non-naturalizing language.
The notion of health for Winnicott 
In Freud and in most of the psychoanalytic 
systems developed from his work (Klein, Lacan, 
Bion), there is no notion of health. In Freud’s text 
we find, for example, the statement that there is no 
descriptive but only theoretical way to refer to the 
notion of health: “It is impossible to define health 
except in metapsychological terms: i.e. by reference 
to the dynamic relations between the agencies of the 
mental apparatus which have been recognized – or 
(if that is preferred) or inferred or conjectured – by 
us” (1937/1985, p. 241, note 2). Assoun considers that 
Winnicott is not so much a psychoanalyst, but much 
more a thinker who provides an anthropology with 
“psychodynamic” resources (2006, p. 67), since he 
does not start from the symptom but from a notion of 
health, which would contrast to what should define 
the position of a psychoanalyst. In this sense, Assoun 
states: “A psychoanalyst starts from the symptom; our 
‘anthropologist’, assuming the whole dimension of 
this term, starts from something else, ‘health’. That is 
precisely what is, therefore, in its most literal sense, 
a clinical anthropology” (2006, p. 67).
However, Winnicott, without taking the risk 
of undoing Freud’s achievements (reintroducing a 
normative, moralizing, idealized, and ideological 
conception of the subjects, both theoretically and 
clinically, since his notion is broad enough to be much 
more an ethic of being than a morality of being), presents 
a descriptive notion of health:
The life of a healthy individual is characterized more 
by fears, conflicting feelings, doubts, frustrations as 
much as by their positive features. The main thing 
is that the man or woman feels he or she is living 
his or her own life, taking responsibility for action 
or inaction, and able to take credit for success and 
blame for failure. In one language it can be said that 
the individual has emerged from dependence to 
independence or autonomy. (1971/1999a, p. 10) (Cf. 
also Fulgencio, 2016, for an analysis of the notion 
of health)
Here, the notion of health is also much closer to the 
way in which modern existentialism considers the mode 
of being human, much closer to the way that Heidegger 
characterizes Dasein than considering the human being 
as an apparatus, an entity of the nature.
Winnicott’s developmentalist perspective 
Winnicott is clear in putting himself as a 
developmentalist: “You will already have perceived that 
by nature and by training and by practice I am a person 
who thinks developmentally” (1984/1999b, p. 42). He 
explains his position:
When I see a boy or a girl at a desk adding and 
subtracting and struggling with the multiplication 
table, I see a person who already has a long history 
in terms of the developmental process, and I know 
that there may be developmental deficiencies, 
developmental distortions, or distortions organized 
to deal with deficiencies that have to be accepted, or 
that there may be a certain precariousness in respect 
to developments that seem to have been achieved. 
I see the development towards independence and 
ever-new meanings to the concept of wholeness 
that may or may not become a fact in that child’s 
future if the child lives. Also, I am all the time 
aware of dependence and the way that the 
environment, originally all-important, continues to 
have significance, and will have significance even 
when the individual reaches towards independence 
by means of an identification with environmental 
features, as a child grows and marries and brings up 
a new generation of children, or begins to take part 
in social life and in the maintenance of the social 
structure. (1984/1999b, pp. 42-43) 
Besides, for him, psychoanalysis alone presents 
this theory of development as a function of relations 
of dependence: “We have the only really useful 
formulation that exists of the way human being 
psychologically develops from an absolute dependent 
immature being to a relatively independent mature 
adult” (1989/1994c, p. 94).
In this context, I would like to highlight the 
general framework of Winnicott’s developmental 
process, that is, his description of the process of 
emotional development focused on the issue of 
dependency (or, in other words, the various ways 
of being-with-the-other), since both the ontology he 
considers (centered on the notion of being) and his 
notion of health are inserted in this context. Specifically 
regarding the stages of infant development, focused 
on the issue of dependency, Winnicott distinguishes 
three major periods: (1) absolute dependence (four 
first months), in which the infant does not yet have 
any possibility of recognizing a non-self reality 
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and the environment (the mother-environment) as 
something external to him; (2) relative dependence 
(up to approximately 1.5 years of age), in which the 
infant can realize the need for details of maternal 
care and can increasingly relate them to the personal 
impulse, phase in which transitional phenomena arise 
and which culminates as the conquest of integration 
or the feeling of the I AM (I am different from the 
world), differing himself from all that is not ‘I’; and (3) 
towards independence (from 1.5 years of age until the 
moment of arrival in the Oedipus phenomenon and its 
relational scenario), in which the infant begins to make 
a series of integrations, until he comes to constitute 
himself as whole person, who has as one of his main 
existential tasks, the administration of the instinctual 
life in the Oedipal scenario, at which point there may 
be relations with objects external to the individual 
(perceived by the individual as external)(1960/1983a, 
pp. 45-46).
It seems to me to be terminologically appropriate, 
with this kind of analysis, to affirm that Winnicott’s 
theory of emotional development is a theory of the 
development of being (of the various ways of being with 
oneself and with the other, expressed in the same terms).
The psychotherapeutic treatment in 
Winiccot’s point of view 
Which is the objective of psychotherapeutic 
treatment, whether in the psychoanalytic setting or in 
other settings? (Although constructed based on this 
psychoanalytic theory of the development proposed by 
Winnicott.) It is about taking an individual to find a place 
to live, having a life that seems real; a life lived from itself, 
where the individual accepts what he is (with his positive 
and negative aspects, limitations, qualities, etc.) and for 
that reason, this life is worth living, whether with more or 
less suffering. It is a matter of seeking, as ideal, what he 
described as health, knowing, however, that individuals 
must come to themselves, have a life from themselves, 
accepting what they are (in their potencies, qualities and 
limitations); being able to take care of themselves and 
others or the place in which they live, being able to repair 
damages that may come from themselves and also take 
advantage of being responsible for doing things of value 
(for themselves and for others). In health, the human being 
can then adapt to the world without losing too much of 
the sense of himself and his spontaneity (1965/2001, 
216), or without excessive loss of his personal impulse 
(1986/1999, 31).
And what would be the psychotherapeutic, 
psychoanalytic or psychoanalytic treatment? What are 
its objectives and dynamics? Considering the several ways 
Winnicott characterized his method of psychoanalytic 
treatment, we can state that: (1) psychoanalysis makes 
it possible for the patient to deal with his/her history, 
taking care of one thing at a time (1958/1978, pp. 
275-276); (2) the treatment corresponds to a prolonged 
anamnesis (1989/1994b, p.109) or to a collection of stories 
(1965/1983c, p.121, 1984, p.264), having the treatment as 
a byproduct (1963 / 1996, p.180); and, fundamentally, (3) 
therapy must occur in the conjunction of analyst’s and 
patient’s playing areas (1971/1975c, 80).
Opposing the question “how much should one 
do?” in analysis, Winnicott established, in his maturity, 
another motto: “how little need be done?” (1965/1983d, 
p. 152). But what exactly does this motto mean? In a 
certain sense, it is a matter of waiting for the patient to 
make his/her own discoveries, but that does not mean 
doing nothing; on the contrary, it is necessary to create the 
conditions so that the patient can himself/herself arrive 
at his/her solutions: “If only we can wait, the patient 
arrives at understanding creatively and with immense 
joy” (1969/1994a, pp. 121-122). It is not a matter of, 
in the strict sense of the term, revealing the repressed 
unconscious, mentally understanding the patient’s story 
and existential condition, but a matter of restoring the 
conditions for the patient to regain autonomy to face his/
her problems and live his/her life by himself/herself, even 
if it is a life of suffering, but without false existence (false 
self) and without false solutions (a false solution is that 
which was not found by the patient himself/herself). The 
psychotherapeutic treatment aims to create environmental 
and communication conditions so that the patient can 
mature: “In a professional setting, given appropriate 
professional behaviour, the ill patient may find a personal 
solution to complex problems of the emotional life and 
of interpersonal relationships; and what we have done is 
to facilitate growth, not to apply a remedy” (1986/1999d, 
pp. 113-114). 
At the end of a psychoanalytic psychotherapeutic 
treatment, or a psychoanalysis-based treatment, the patient 
should conquer the possibility of having a relatively 
autonomous life, being able to take care of himself/
herself and others – as should be the case with his/her 
children –, so that the psychotherapist, in this sense, is no 
longer a support or a necessary environmental support, 
to the point of being able to disappear: “At the end of 
endless ramifications in term of hypochondriac fantasy 
and persecutory delusion a patient has a dream which 
says:  I eat you. Here is stark simplicity like that of the 
Oedipus complex” (1965/1983b, p. 153). 
Final considerations
Bringing back this series of references – ontology, 
health as telos, the process of development described 
in terms of the situations lived and their achievements, 
some aspects of the psychotherapeutic process –, is used 
here to show that Winnicott integrated all the descriptive 
discoveries made by psychoanalysis of Freud, Klein, and 
others of his contemporaries, with the conceptions that 
I considered in agreement (conceptual and descriptive, 
although not exactly the same) with those found in 
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modern existentialism, aiming to show they arise in the 
descriptions of the psychic-emotional process  and also 
can be taken up in the psychotherapeutic processes and 
in the handling of the relationship between the patient 
and his analyst.
With Winnicott, the ontology, the developmentalist 
telos (whether in health or in pathological organizations), 
the consideration of ways of being and of inter-
human determination, are, therefore, much more in 
agreement with what phenomenology and existential 
analytics expected that could be the basis of a scientific 
psychology according to Dasein, than the naturalistic 
model initially proposed by Freud... without ceasing 
to be psychoanalysis, since it maintains the empirical 
foundations of psychoanalysis (recognition of unconscious 
psychic processes, transference, resistance, repression, 
the importance of sexuality and the Oedipus complex 
in the process of development and psychic organization 
of the human being), even though it has restructured its 
epistemological framework.
Pode a psicanálise de Winnicott ser a realização de um projeto de psicologia científica de orientação 
fenomenológica?
Resumo: Neste artigo pretendo desenvolver a hipótese de que a obra de Winnicott pode corresponder a uma realização 
possível do projeto de elaboração de uma psicologia científica não naturalista, tal como indicado nas concepções filosóficas da 
fenomenologia e do existencialismo moderno. Depois de distinguir o que seriam os aspectos clínicos destas propostas filosóficas, 
procuro mostrar que Winnicott, por um lado, rejeita o uso de especulações metapsicológias naturalistas, e por outro, reformula 
o modelo ontológico da psicanálise, com a introdução da noção de ser; além de introduzir uma noção de saúde e redescrever 
a teoria do desenvolvimento socioemocional do ser humano focando-a nas suas relações de dependêndia.Tais modificações 
colocariam a psicanálise num quadro epistemológico não naturalista, mais de acordo com essas influências filosóficas citadas, 
modificando também a própria prática psicanalítica, seja em termos dos seus objetivos seja em termos do seu manejo.
Palavras-chave: psicanálise, fenomenologia, existencialismo, epistemologia, psicoterapia.
La psychanalyse de Winnicott peut-elle être un projet de psychologie scientifique d’orientation 
phénoménologique ?
Résumé: Dans cet article, j’ai l’intention de développer l’hypothèse selon laquelle l’oeuvre de Winnicott peut correspondre 
à une réalisation possible du projet d’élaboration d’une psychologie scientifique non-naturaliste comme on voit dans les 
conceptions philosophiques de la phénoménologie et de l’existentialisme moderne. Après la distinction des aspects cliniques 
de ces propositions philosophiques, je cherche à montrer, d’un côté, que Winnicott rejette l’utilisation de spéculations 
métapsychologiques naturaliste, de l’autre côté, qu’il reformule le modèle ontologique de la psychanalyse, avec l’introduction 
de la notion d’être ; au-delà d’introduire une notion de santé et de redécrire la théorie du développement socio-émotionnel 
de l’être humain en la recentrant sur ses relations de dépendance. Ces motifications mettraient la psychanalyse dans un 
cadre épistémologique non-naturaliste, plutôt alignée sur les influences philosophiques citées, modifiant par là la pratique 
psychanalytique elle-même, soit vis-à-vis de ses objectifs soit vis-à-vis de son maniement.
Mots-clés: psychanalyse, phénoménologie, existentialisme, épistémologie, psychothérapie.
¿El psicoanálisis de Winnicott puede ser un proyecto de psicología científica de orientación fenomenológica?
Resumen: En este artículo, mi objetivo es desarrollar la hipótesis de que la obra de Winnicott puede corresponder a una 
realización posible del proyecto de elaboración de una psicología científica no naturalista, como se ve en las concepciones 
filosóficas de la fenomenología y del existencialismo moderno. Después de distinguir los aspectos clínicos de esas propuestas 
filosóficas, busco mostrar que Winnicott, por un lado, rechaza la utilización de especulaciones metapsicológicas naturalistas, 
por otro lado, reformula el modelo ontológico del psicoanálisis, con la introducción de la noción de ser; además de introducir 
una noción de salud y de redescribir la teoría del desarrollo socioemocional del ser humano, examinándola en sus relaciones de 
dependencia. Esas modificaciones pondrían el psicoanálisis en un marco epistemológico no naturalista, pero en conformidad 
con las influencias filosóficas citadas, modificando también la propia práctica psicoanalítica, sea con respecto a sus objetivos 
sea con respecto a su manejo. 
Palabras clave: psicoanálisis, fenomenología, existencialismo, epistemología, psicoterapia.
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